After Kiobel: An Essential Step to Displacing the Presumption against Extraterritoriality by Clegg, Bryan M
SMU Law Review
Volume 67 | Issue 2 Article 7
2014
After Kiobel: An Essential Step to Displacing the
Presumption against Extraterritoriality
Bryan M. Clegg
Follow this and additional works at: https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr
This Comment is brought to you for free and open access by the Law Journals at SMU Scholar. It has been accepted for inclusion in SMU Law Review
by an authorized administrator of SMU Scholar. For more information, please visit http://digitalrepository.smu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Bryan M. Clegg, After Kiobel: An Essential Step to Displacing the Presumption against Extraterritoriality, 67 SMU L. Rev. 373 (2014)
https://scholar.smu.edu/smulr/vol67/iss2/7
AFTER KIOBEL: AN "ESSENTIAL STEP"




For thirty-three years, victims of international human rights abuses relied
primarily upon the Alien Tort Statute to redress their injuries in U.S.
courts. In an unexpected move, the Supreme Court in Kiobel v. Royal
Dutch Petroleum invoked the presumption against extraterritoriality to up-
end the deeply entrenched interpretation that the statute applied to claims
composed of entirely foreign conduct and foreign parties. Prior to the
holding in Kiobel, one federal court went so far as to hold that the Alien
Tort Statute applied exclusively to extraterritorial claims. After Kiobel,
courts, scholars, attorneys, commentators, and human rights activists are
unsure whether or to what extent the Alien Tort Statute applies to extrater-
ritorial human rights abuses at all. This Comment argues that the Alien
Tort Statute does still apply to extraterritorial human rights abuses and
provides a specific explanation of the extent of its future application.
The Kiobel Court concluded its opinion with mysterious dicta discussing
hypothetical future claims brought under the Alien Tort Statute and intro-
duced a brand new displacement standard for determining whether those
future claims overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality. Imme-
diately following the decision, scholars and commentators pointed to this
standard as the best roadmap to applying the Alien Tort Statute to future
extraterritorial claims. However, no one knows precisely how to under-
stand it or apply it. Indeed, all three of Kiobel's concurrences made a point
to recognize that the displacement standard fails to provide a clear
roadmap for future claims. In the short period of time since the opinion
was released, only one scholarly article has waded into the murky waters to
make an attempt at it. Even there, the discussion was merely one section of
a larger paper, and thus left important questions unanswered. Meanwhile,
human rights attorneys embroiled in litigation and federal courts trying to
reach well-reasoned decisions are stuck having to wrestle with the enig-
matic standard without much guidance.
* J.D. Candidate, SMU Dedman School of Law, May 2015; B.A. with High Honors,
The University of Texas at Austin, May 2009. I would like to thank Professor Anthony J.
Colangelo and Christopher R. Knight for their helpful comments and edits on a prior draft.
I would also like to thank my lovely wife, Lauren, for her constant encouragement and
support.
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This is the first paper entirely devoted to unraveling the mystery of the
displacement standard and its application to future international human
rights litigation. Moreover, it is the first time anyone has attempted to pro-
vide a robust analysis of the Kiobel Court's citation to Morrison in support
of the displacement standard. It also provides an innovative solution
grounded in well-established Supreme Court precedent for human rights
attorneys and activists to consider when filing extraterritorial human rights
claims in U.S. courts, while also supplying much needed guidance for fed-
eral courts pondering how to apply the displacement standard. The inter-
pretation and application of the displacement standard will determine not
only whether the Alien Tort Statute remains relevant for international
human rights litigation, but, for the many victims of international human
rights abuses in countries with undeveloped legal systems, it may also ulti-
mately determine whether they have access to a remedy at all.
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INTRODUCTIONIN Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., Nigerian nationals sued
Dutch and British corporations under the Alien Tort Statute (ATS)
for violating the law of nations, alleging that the corporations aided
and abetted Nigerian military and police forces in, among other things,
murdering, raping, and beating members of certain Nigerian villages.'
The United States Supreme Court framed the issue as whether the ATS
applied to claims made up of conduct occurring entirely outside the terri-
tory of the United States.2 In reaching its decision, the Court held that
the presumption against the extraterritorial application of U.S. laws (the
presumption) applied to claims arising under the ATS and nothing in the
statute rebutted that presumption.3 Therefore, it affirmed the dismissal of
the claim.4 Before concluding its opinion, however, the Supreme Court
included dictum addressing potential future ATS claims under different
circumstances.s It explained that "even where the claims touch and con-
cern the territory of the United States, they must do so with sufficient
force to displace the presumption against extraterritorial application"'6
(the displacement standard).
The holding in Kiobel severely undermined the ATS's role as the
predominate vehicle for litigating international human rights abuses in
U.S. courts.7 It reversed a thirty-three-year history of courts applying the
ATS to extraterritorial law-of-nations violations involving entirely foreign
conduct and foreign parties.8 Nevertheless, there remains a distinct-yet
wholly undetermined-possibility that certain victims of international
human rights abuses may still be able to use the ATS to redress their
injuries in U.S. courts.9 The displacement standard creates the potential
1. 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1662-63 (2013).
2. Id. at 1662.
3. Id. at 1669.
4. Id.
5. See id.
6. Id. (citing Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 266-73 (2010)).
7. See, e.g., Rich Samp, Supreme Court Observations: Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petro-
leum & the Future of Alien Tort Litigation, FORBES (Apr. 18, 2013, 10:51 AM), http://www
.forbes.comlsites/wlf/2013/04/18/supreme-court-observations-kiobel-v-royal-dutch-petrole
um-the-future-of-alien-tort-litigation/.
8. See Samp, supra note 7.
9. Oona Hathaway, Kiobel Commentary: The Door Remains Open for "Foreign




for a future extraterritorial application of the statute to a limited and un-
known class of cases. 10 To date, only one scholarly article has attempted
to provide a coherent legal framework for identifying those cases." The
question, however, deserves much more attention because its resolution
will help determine the extent to which victims of human rights abuses
abroad can continue to rely on the ATS to gain access to U.S. courts.12
All three concurrences in Kiobel acknowledged that the displacement
standard fails to provide a clear roadmap for future extraterritorial ATS
claims.13 Justice Kennedy, in his brief concurrence, pointed out that
"[t]he opinion for the Court is careful to leave open a number of signifi-
cant questions regarding the reach and interpretation of the [ATS]."14
Justice Alito, joined by Justice Thomas, explained that the displacement
standard "obviously leaves much unanswered."' 5 Finally, Justice Breyer,
concurring in judgment and joined by Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and
Kagan, criticized the majority opinion for "offer[ing] only limited help in
deciding. . . 'under what circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recog-
nize [an extraterritorial claim]."1 6 According to Justice Breyer, although
"[the majority] makes clear that a statutory claim might sometimes 'touch
and concern the territory of the United States . . . with sufficient force to
displace the presumption[,]' [i]t leaves for another day the determination
of just when the presumption against extraterritoriality might be
'overcome.""'7
With both judges and practitioners in mind, this paper attempts to pro-
vide a workable solution that coheres with Supreme Court precedent by
answering two fundamental questions surrounding the displacement stan-
dard: (1) what does the citation to Morrison v. National Australian Bank
Ltd.'8 reveal about its criteria, and (2) what type of claim will satisfy that
criteria? As to the first question, I argue that the displacement standard is
nothing more than Morrison's focus-based analysis with an extra element
added to it: sufficient force. The Court added sufficient force to the analy-
sis so that it could limit the potentially broad extraterritorial outcomes of
applying the focus-based analysis to a strictly jurisdictional statute. I then
10. See, e.g., Anthony J. Colangelo, What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 CORNELL
L. REV. (forthcoming 2014) (manuscript at 34-36) (on file with author); Hathaway, supra
note 9.
11. See Colangelo, supra note 10, at 4-5. Although there are blog posts discussing the
language, so far this is the only scholarly article attempting to explain the Court's meaning
and proposing a workable framework for future extraterritorial ATS claims.
12. As discussed in Part IV of this paper, it may still be possible for victims of human
rights abuses abroad to access U.S. Courts through a territorial application of the ATS by
pursuing accessorial liability. This option, however, would not require displacing the pre-
sumption because the presumption is in place to protect against improper extraterritorial
application. There is no presumption to displace when the application is territorial.
13. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013) (Kennedy,
J., concurring); id. at 1669-70 (Alito, J., concurring); id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring).
14. Id. at 1669 (Kennedy, J., concurring).
15. Id. (Alito, J., concurring).
16. Id. at 1673 (Breyer, J., concurring) (citation omitted).
17. Id.
18. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 264-73 (2010).
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argue that the Court likely had domestic conduct in mind when it in-
cluded this limitation. As to the second question, I argue that application
of a well-settled legal doctrine-which I call the "essential step doc-
trine"-to certain domestic conduct connected to an extraterritorial claim
is a viable method to displace the presumption.
I begin, in Part I, by discussing the simultaneous modern development
of the ATS's application to extraterritorial claims and the rise of the mod-
em presumption against extraterritoriality. Then, in Part II, I examine the
collision of the ATS and the presumption in Kiobel, which ultimately pro-
duced the displacement standard. I also discuss how lower courts have
applied the displacement standard. In part III, I make an argument for
what the displacement standard means in light of the Supreme Court's
citation to Morrison. Finally, in Part IV, I argue that application of the
essential step doctrine should work to displace the presumption, allowing
courts to adjudicate certain extraterritorial claims arising under the ATS.
I then recognize a similarity between these claims and accessorial liabil-
ity, but proceed to explain important differences between the two.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF THE ATS & THE PRESUMPTION
AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
In the years leading up to Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, lower
courts were regularly applying the ATS to extraterritorial claims.19 This
made the ATS the primary vehicle for litigating international human
rights abuses within the United States.20 During that same time period,
however, the Supreme Court began cementing a strong presumption
against extraterritoriality into its jurisprudence. 21 This section briefly dis-
cusses the history of both developments.
A. PRE-KIOBEL APPLICATION OF THE ATS TO
EXTRATERRITORIAL CLAIMS
In 1789, the first Congress enacted the ATS as part of the Judiciary
Act.2 2 The ATS provided that "new federal district courts 'shall also have
cognizance ... of all causes where an alien sues for a tort only in violation
of the law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 23 Over the years,
the language of the ATS has experienced a few modifications, 24 and its
current form reads: "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of the
law of nations or a treaty of the United States." 25
The ATS was used on two separate occasions shortly after its enact-
19. See infra note 35 and accompanying text.
20. See infra note 34 and accompanying text.
21. See infra notes 41-47 and accompanying text.
22. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
23. Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 712-13 (2004) (quoting Act of Sept. 24,
1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77).
24. Sosa, 542 U.S. at 713 n.10.
25. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
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ment.2 6 For the next 167 years, however, it went virtually unnoticed. 27
Although resurfacing in a 1960 Second Circuit case,28 it officially reen-
tered the spotlight in 1980.29 In Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, Paraguayan citi-
zens filed an ATS suit in the Eastern District of New York against the
former Inspector General of Police in Asuncion, Paraguay, for kidnap-
ping and then torturing their son to death in Paraguay.30 The district
court dismissed the case on jurisdictional grounds.3' On appeal, the appli-
cation of the ATS was squarely before the Second Circuit.32 The Second
Circuit reversed the district court, holding that the ATS granted federal
courts jurisdiction to hear the case because official torture violates the
law of nations.33 This holding "paved the way for international human
rights litigation in U.S. courts." 34
For the next thirty-three years, courts across the nation appeared to
accept the Second Circuit's interpretation and applied the ATS to extra-
territorial conduct.35 A few years before Kiobel was decided, one district
court went so far as to declare that the ATS applied only to conduct oc-
curring outside the territorial boundaries of the United States. 36 That
court explained that "the expanded role for the ATS has always been
understood as covering torts committed abroad. As a result, the [c]ourt
ha[d] not found a single post-Filartiga case addressing claims arising out
of domestic conduct."37 Relying on this impression, it dismissed the ATS
claim before the court because the conduct occurred within the territorial
boundaries of the United States.38 On appeal, the Second Circuit sug-
gested that the district court got it wrong, but expressly refused to address
the issue because it could decide the case on other grounds. 39 In a foot-
note, however, it recognized that the Supreme Court was currently ad-
dressing the jurisdictional reach of the ATS in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch
26. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1663.
27. See id. ("[T]he ATS was invoked twice in the late 18th century, but then only once
more over the next 167 years.").
28. Khedivial Line, S.A.E. v. Seafarers' Int'l Union, 278 F.2d 49, 51-52 (2d Cir. 1960).
29. See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 724-25 (2004); see also Curtis A. Brad-
ley, The Alien Tort Statute and Article III, 42 VA. J. INT'L L. 587, 588 (2002).
30. Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 878-79 (2d Cir. 1980).
31. Id. at 880.
32. Id.
33. Id. at 878.
34. Bradley, supra note 29, at 589.
35. See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 747 (9th Cir. 2011) cert. granted, judg-
ment vacated sub nom. Rio Tinto PLC v. Sarei, 133 S. Ct. 1995 (2013); Garcia v. Chapman,
911 F. Supp. 2d 1222, 1239 (S.D. Fla. 2012); Lizarbe v. Rondon, 642 F. Supp. 2d 473, 492
(D. Md. 2009) affd in part, appeal dismissed in part on other grounds sub nom. Ochoa
Lizarbe v. Rivera Rondon, 402 F. App'x 834 (4th Cir. 2010); Adhikari v. Daoud & Part-
ners, 697 F. Supp. 2d 674, 686 (S.D. Tex. 2009); Chavez v. Carranza, 413 F. Supp. 2d 891,
898-99 (W.D. Tenn. 2005); Xuncax v. Gramajo, 886 F. Supp. 162, 169, 193 (D. Mass. 1995);
Krishanthi v. Rajaratnam, 09-CV-05395 DMC-JAD, 2010 WL 3429529, at *1, *11 (D.N.J.
Aug. 26, 2010).
36. Velez v. Sanchez, 754 F. Supp. 2d 488, 496-97 (E.D.N.Y. 2010) aff'd in part, va-
cated in part on other grounds, 693 F.3d 308 (2d Cir. 2012).
37. Id. at 496.
38. Id. at 497-98.
39. See Velez v. Sanchez, 693 F.3d 308, 318 (2d Cir. 2012).
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Petroleum Co.4 0
B. PRE-KIOBEL DEVELOPMENT OF THE PRESUMPTION
AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Almost a decade after the Second Circuit reinvigorated the ATS and
applied it to the extraterritorial conduct of foreign defendants, the Su-
preme Court invoked a long-standing tool of statutory construction to
deny the extraterritorial application of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.41 In E.E.O.C. v. Arabian American Oil Co. (Aramco), the Court
explained that "[i]t is a longstanding principle of American law 'that leg-
islation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is meant to apply
only within the territorial jurisdiction of the United States."' 42 The pur-
pose behind the rule is "to protect against unintended clashes between
our laws and those of other nations which could result in international
discord." 43 As a result, the Court declared, "[w]e assume that Congress
legislates against the backdrop of the presumption against extraterritori-
ality," and statutes do not apply extraterritorially "unless there is 'the
affirmative intention of the Congress clearly expressed."' 44
The application of the presumption in Aramco began to reverse the
pervading trend of the lower courts, which became "increasingly willing
to apply federal statutes" to extraterritorial conduct.45 It was also a de-
parture from the Court's extraterritorial jurisprudence applied to the
Sherman Act.46 Following Aramco, the Court has continued to apply the
presumption 4 7 reinforcing its central place in extraterritorial jurisdiction
jurisprudence.
Aramco's formulation of the presumption-including the requirement
of a clear expression of intent to rebut it48-can be traced back to Foley
Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, decided in 1949.49 However, in Steele v. Bulova
40. Id. at 318 n.6.
41. See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 258-59 (1991).
42. Id. at 248.
43. Id.
44. Id.
45. See Caleb Nelson, State and Federal Models of the Interaction Between Statutes and
Unwritten Law, 80 U. CHI. L. REV. 657, 694 (2013).
46. Cf Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California, 509 US 764, 814 (1993) (Scalia, J., dissent-
ing) (noting that "[t]he Sherman act contains similar 'boilerplate language [to Aramco],'
and if the question were not governed by precedent, it would be worth considering
whether that presumption controls the outcome here." However, "it is now well estab-
lished that the Sherman Act applies extraterritorially.").
47. See, e.g., Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1669 (2013); Mor-
rison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2881 (2010); Sale v. Haitian Ctrs. Council,
Inc., 509 U.S. 155, 173 (1993); see also Nelson, supra note 45, at 714.
48. In Morrison, the Court clarified that the "clear statement rule" is not restricted to
"a requirement that a statute say 'this law applies abroad,'" but rather permits courts to
consider the context of the statute as well. Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2883.
49. See Foley Bros., Inc. v. Filardo, 336 US 281, 285 (1949); see also E.E.O.C. v. Ara-
bian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248 (1991) (relying substantially on Foley Bros. to articu-
late the presumption); Nelson, supra note 45, at 720 ("As we have seen, that formulation of
the canon dates back to Foley Bros.").
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Watch Co., just three years after Foley Bros. was decided, the Supreme
Court applied the Lanham Act to foreign conduct without a clear expres-
sion that the statute should apply extraterritorially.50 The issue in Steele
was whether a "United States District Court has jurisdiction to award
relief to an American corporation against acts of trade-mark infringe-
ment and unfair competition consummated in a foreign country by a citi-
zen and resident of the United States."51 To be sure, in Steele, the Court
identified the presumption and even pointed to statutory language evinc-
ing "broad jurisdictional grant" to regulate "'all commerce which may
lawfully be regulated by Congress.'"52 However, it never said that Con-
gress clearly expressed intent for the Lanham Act to apply extraterritori-
ally.5 3 Instead, the Court held that the domestic conduct was sufficient to
fall within the jurisdictional grant of the statute, thus enabling the Court
to award relief for the infringing conduct consummated abroad.54
The Supreme Court emphasized two important facts. One was that the
finished products filtered into the United States.55 Consequently, the
"competing goods could well reflect adversely on Bulova Watch Com-
pany's trade reputation in markets cultivated by advertising here as well
as abroad."56 The other fact was that the component parts for the prod-
ucts displaying the infringing marks were purchased in the United
States.57 The Court went on to explain that it did not "deem material"
that the infringing conduct occurred in Mexico, or that the conduct within
the United States, "when viewed in isolation[,] d[id] not violate any of
our laws."58 What mattered was that the domestic conduct was an "essen-
tial step[ ] in the course of business consummated abroad; acts legal in
themselves lose that character when they become part of an unlawful
scheme." 59 Given these facts, the Court applied the Lanham Act
extraterritorially. 60
Steele was not overruled by Aramco's reinvigoration of the presump-
tion. Instead, Aramco expressly approved of Steele.61 It explained that
Steele reached its conclusion in light of the broad legislative intent to reg-
ulate the deceptive use of marks connected to all commerce lawfully reg-
ulated by Congress and "the fact that the allegedly unlawful conduct had
some effects within the United States." 62 As mentioned above, one of
those effects was the purchase of component parts within the United
States, which became unlawful in the same way a domestic infringement
50. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 285-86 (1952).
51. Id. at 281.
52. See id. at 285-87.
53. See id. at 286-87.
54. See id.
55. See id. at 286.
56. Id.
57. See id.
58. Id. at 287.
59. Id.
60. See id. at 286.
61. See E.E.O.C. v. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 449 U.S. 244, 252 (1991).
62. Id.
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would be unlawful because it was one of the "essential steps" to the ulti-
mate consummation of the infringement abroad.63 In light of these facts
in Steele, the Court in Aramco declared that the "statute was properly
interpreted as applying abroad." 64
In 2010, the Supreme Court decided its most recent pre-Kiobel case
involving application of the presumption-Morrison v. National Austra-
lian Bank Ltd.6 5 In Morrison, the Court decided whether the anti-fraud
provision "of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934 provides a cause of
action to foreign plaintiffs suing foreign and American defendants for
misconduct in connection with securities traded on foreign exchanges.""
The case involved an Australian bank (the Bank) that traded its stocks on
the Australian Stock Exchange Limited and Australian investors (the In-
vestors) alleging that the Bank defrauded them by making materially
false statements and manipulating financial models.67 The Bank owned a
mortgage servicer headquartered in Florida, and from 1998-2001 the
Bank's public documents "touted the success" of the mortgage service
and its officers "did the same in public statements."68 However, between
July and September of 2001, the Bank wrote down the value of the mort-
gage servicer's assets by over $2 billion.69 The Investors purchased shares
in the Bank in 2000 and 2001, and after the write-down they sued the
Bank in the Southern District of New York, alleging, among other things,
violations of § 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934.70
The Supreme Court affirmed the dismissal of the lawsuit because the
statute did not express a clear intent to apply extraterritorially, 71 and the
conduct relevant to the statute's focus did not occur within the United
States. 72 As to the latter issue, the Investors argued that the Bank
manipulated the mortgage servicer's financial models and made mislead-
ing public statements in Florida.73 Thus, according to the Investors, al-
though the shares were bought on the Australian Exchange Market, the
statute should be applied domestically because the deceptive conduct oc-
curred in the United States.74 The Court rejected this interpretation of
the statute, explaining that the presumption against extraterritoriality
cannot be overcome just because there is some domestic conduct related
to the claim.75 Instead, the domestic conduct must be part of the "focus of
congressional concern." 76 The Court concluded "that the focus of the Ex-
63. See Steele, 344 U.S. at 287.
64. Arabian Am. Oil Co., 499 U.S. at 252.
65. 561 U.S. 247 (2010).
66. Id. at 250.
67. Id. at 251.
68. Id. at 251-52.
69. Id. at 252.
70. Id.
71. Id. at 254-65.
72. Id. at 266-69.
73. Id. at 266.
74. Id.
75. Id.
76. Id. (quotation marks omitted).
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change Act is not upon the place where the deception originated, but
upon the purchases and sales of securities in the United States."77 That is,
the statute regulates only deceptive conduct connected to "transactions in
securities listed on domestic exchanges, and domestic transactions in
other securities."78 Furthermore, the Court also rejected the argument
that the Exchange Act applies to domestic conduct affecting exchanges or
transactions abroad because "[t]he probability of incompatibility with the
applicable laws of other countries is so obvious that if Congress intended
such foreign application it would have addressed the subject of conflicts
with foreign laws and procedures." 79
Finally, the Court devoted an entire section of its opinion to reject a
"'significant and material conduct' test" for transnational securities fraud
proposed by the Solicitor General.80 The test would extend the reach of
the Exchange Act to foreign conduct "when the fraud involves significant
conduct in the United States that is material to the fraud's success."81 The
Court rejected this test because it found no textual support for it, ob-
served adverse consequences of adopting the test, and disagreed with
Second Circuit case law applying the test.82
During this discussion the Court reaffirmed Steele v. Bulova Watch Co.
in a footnote.83 In footnote eleven, the Court addressed a number of
cases the Solicitor General cited in its briefs to support applying non-
extraterritorial statutes whenever any (not just focus-based) domestic
conduct affected consequences abroad.84 One of those cases was Steele.85
The Court rejected the interpretation of Steele as supporting the Solicitor
General's argument.86 Citing Aramco for support, it briefly recognized,
without any other explanation, that Steele interpreted the Lanham Act
... to have "extraterritorial effect."87
After dispensing with the Solicitor General's arguments, the Court
summarized its holding. It explained that the statute only punished de-
ception connected to the purchase or sale of securities listed on the
American stock exchange or the purchase or sale of securities within the
77. Id.
78. Id. It is interesting to note that the Court went out of its way to show that the
Congressional focus of the "transactions in other securities" was domestic. Id. at 267. This
appears to be unnecessary in light of its holding that the presumption against extraterritori-
ality applied to the statute. See id. at 266. Concluding that the presumption applied and
that there was no clear intent to rebut it should have been enough for the court to classify
any focus of the statute as domestic. To hold otherwise admits the absurd possibility that
the statute focuses on foreign activity but extraterritorial application is barred by the
presumption.
79. Id. at 267.
80. Id. at 269-73.
81. Id. at 270.
82. Id. at 269-72.
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United States (i.e., connected to the focus of the statute).88 The securities
involved in Morrison, however, were listed on a foreign exchange, "and
all aspects of the purchases complained of . . . occurred outside the
United States."89 Therefore, the Investors failed to state a claim.90
II. THE COLLISION OF THE ATS & THE PRESUMPTION
AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY IN KIOBEL V
ROYAL DUTCH PETROLEUM CO.
The modem development of the ATS and the presumption collided in
Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.91 As discussed above, prior to Ki-
obel, lower courts generally had no problem applying the ATS to extra-
territorial claims. 92 However, the Supreme Court upended this
interpretation in Kiobel.
A. A NEW "DISPLACEMENT" STANDARD FOR EXTRATERRITORIAL
APPLICATION OF THE ATS
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court applied the presumption to a claim aris-
ing under the ATS and concluded that the ATS did not communicate
intent to rebut the presumption.93 Therefore, the Court held that the ATS
did not authorize adjudication of an extraterritorial claim alleging that
British, Dutch, and Nigerian companies violated the law of nations in Ni-
geria.94 At the outset, the Court recognized a challenge to applying the
presumption to the ATS: the presumption was typically applied to "an
Act of Congress regulating conduct," but "[t]he ATS, on the other hand,
[was] 'strictly jurisdictional.' 95 To apply the presumption to the ATS,
then, the Court had to make an exception to its typical approach. 96
The exception crafted by the Court was motivated by the policy con-
cerns underlying the presumption. It pointed to the presumption's under-
lying principles and interpreted those principles as "constrain[ing] courts
considering causes of action that may be brought under the ATS."97 The
Court, quoting Aramco, explained that the presumption "'serves to pro-
tect against unintended clashes between our laws and those of other na-
tions which could result in international discord." 98 Prior precedent was
in agreement that the ATS magnifies the potential for judicial interfer-
ence in foreign affairs because it requires courts to interpret the law of
nations, which "raise[s] risks of adverse foreign policy consequences." 99
88. Id. at 273.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. 133 S. Ct. 1659 (2013).
92. See supra note 35 and accompanying text.
93. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
94. See id.
95. Id. at 1664 (quoting Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 713 (2004)).
96. See id.
97. Id. at 1664.




According to the Court, this concern was "all the more pressing when the
question [was] whether a cause of action under the ATS reaches conduct
within the territory of another sovereign." 00 Given this backdrop, the
Court concluded that the presumption constrained the ATS.10
The rest of the opinion addressed whether the text, history, or purpose
of the ATS rebut the presumption by expressing "a clear indication of
extraterritoriality."1 02 The Court concluded that they do not.103 Finding
no clear intent that the ATS should apply extraterritorially, the Court
held that."nothing in the statute rebuts that presumption . . . and petition-
ers' case seeking relief for violations of the law of nations occurring
outside the United States is barred." 104
After reaching its conclusion, however, the Court included a mysteri-
ous paragraph explaining how future ATS claims might displace the pre-
sumption. First, it pointed out that under the facts in Kiobel, "all the
relevant conduct took place outside the United States." 05 Then it went
on to contrast these facts with hypothetical "claims [that] touch and con-
cern the territory of the United States," explaining that these claims will
displace the presumption if they touch and concern U.S. territory with
"sufficient force."106 To support this new displacement standard, it cited
to Morrison v. National Australian Bank Ltd.107 Specifically, it cited to
the portions of Morrison discussing the focus-based analysis, which the
Supreme Court used to determine whether certain domestic conduct was
sufficient to overcome the presumption against extraterritoriality.108 Fi-
nally, it concluded that "it would reach too far to say that mere corporate
presence suffices."1 09
B. LOWER COURTS INTERPRET THE DISPLACEMENT STANDARD TO
REQUIRE DOMESTIC CONDUCT
The Second Circuit addressed Kiobel's displacement standard shortly
after Kiobel was decided.110 In Balintulo v. Daimler, it explained that
under Kiobel, the presumption barred all claims where all the relevant
conduct occurred in the territory of another country."' It viewed the ex-
traterritorial conduct as dispositive.112 Armed with this understanding of
Kiobel, the Second Circuit interpreted the displacement standard as a
bright-line rule: ATS claims are barred by the presumption unless rele-
100. Id. at 1665.
101. Id.
102. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).





108. See id. (citing Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266-73 (2010)).
109. Id.; see also Daimler AG v. Bauman, 134 S. Ct. 746, 762-63 (2014).
110. See Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174 (2d Cir. 2013).
111. Id. at 189.
112. Id. at 191.
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vant conduct occurs within the United States-no exceptions.113
The Second Circuit rejected the contention that Kiobel adopted a "new
presumption" for the ATS when it wrote the displacement standard.114
Specifically, it rejected the argument that the Supreme Court implied that
"corporate citizenship" might displace the presumption when it made the
statement that "mere corporate presence" would not suffice.' 15 The court
explained its conclusion by emphasizing Kiobel's repeated focus on the
foreign conduct in the case, and then rejected distinctions based on the
defendant's citizenship as irrelevant.116 Moreover, in a footnote, the court
reinforced its conclusion by highlighting its compatibility with the histori-
cal focus of the presumption, explaining that "the presumption of extra-
territoriality traditionally has 'focused on the site of the conduct, not the
identity of the defendant.""' 1 7 The Second Circuit also dismissed the peti-
tioner's argument that a compelling American interest was enough to dis-
place the presumption, explaining that this argument "miss[ed] the mark"
because it did not satisfy the clear indication requirement necessary to
rebut the presumption.118
The three other federal courts to address claims involving American
defendants reached conclusions consistent with the Second Circuit. In Al
Shimari v. CACI Premier Technology, Inc., the Fourth Circuit explained
that the "ATS claims connection to the territory of the United States and
[the defendant's] relevant conduct in the United States require a different
result than that reached in Kiobel."119 Similarly, in Sexual Minorities
Uganda v. Lively, the District of Massachusetts held that the claim dis-
placed the presumption because the "offensive conduct [was] alleged to
have occurred, in substantial part, within this country." 120 Whereas, in
Giraldo v. Drummond Co., the Northern District of Alabama held that
the claim could not displace the presumption because the torts occurred
abroad.121
113. See id. at 190 ("[I]f all the relevant conduct occurred abroad, that is simply the end
of the matter under Kiobel."); see also Al Shimari v. CACI Premier Tech., Inc., No. 13-1937
2014 WL 2922840, at *10 (4th Cir. June 30, 2014) ("[T]he Second Circuit construed the
Court's 'touch and concern' language as imparting the exercise of jurisdiction only 'when
some of the relevant conduct occurs in the United States."').
114. Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 189.
115. Id. at 189.
116. Id. at 189-90.
117. Id. at 190 n.24 (quoting Doe v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 654 F.3d 11, 74-76 (D.C. Cir.
2011) (Kavanaugh, J., dissenting)).
118. Id. at 191.
119. No. 13-1937, 2014 WL 2922840, at *10 (4th Cir. June 3, 2014).
120. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 12-CV-30051-MAP, 2013 WL 4130756, at *2
(D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013).
121. See Giraldo v. Drummond Co., Inc., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960,
at *8 (N.D. Ala. Jul. 25, 2013).
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III. INTERPRETING THE DISPLACEMENT STANDARD
IN LIGHT OF MORRISON V. NATIONAL
AUSTRALIAN BANK LTD.
In Kiobel, the Supreme Court said that the presumption would be dis-
placed whenever "claims touch and concern the territory of the United
States . . . with sufficient force."' 22 To support this statement, the Court
cited to Morrison.123 My interpretation of Kiobel's displacement standard
rests upon the premise that it should be interpreted in light of this citation
to Morrison. Accordingly, I will begin by explaining how the portion of
Morrison that the Kiobel Court cited relates to the displacement stan-
dard. Then I will interpret the displacement standard in a manner consis-
tent with this relationship.
A. THE DISPLACEMENT STANDARD REQUIRES MORRISON'S
Focus-BASED ANALYSIS
In the portion of Morrison the Kiobel Court cited to support the dis-
placement standard, the Supreme Court had already determined that the
presumption barred the extraterritorial application of the Exchange
Act.124 Nevertheless, it entertained the possibility that domestic conduct
related to the § 10(b) claim might be sufficient to apply the statute any-
way. 125 It explained that not just any contacts with the United States will
trigger the enforcement of a statute barred by the presumption, thus
causing the presumption to "retreat."1 26 Instead, the domestic contacts
necessary to make the presumption retreat need to fall within the focus of
the statute. 127 The Court concluded that the focus of the Exchange Act
concerned the regulation of the purchase or sale of securities on Ameri-
can exchanges or the purchase or sale of other securities within the
United States.128 Thus, even though the Court had already determined
that the presumption applied to the statute, it held that the statute might
still be enforced if securities were purchased or sold on American ex-
changes or purchased or sold domestically.129 The securities, however,
were traded on foreign markets and "all aspects of the purchases" oc-
curred abroad; therefore, the Court held that the domestic conduct could
not overcome the presumption.o30
To fully understand how this portion of the opinion coheres with the
displacement standard-which operates as a mechanism to dislodge the
122. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
123. Id. (citing to Morrison v. Nat'1 Austl. Bank, 561 U.S. 247, 265-73 (2010)).
124. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 265-73.
125. Id. at 266-67.
126. Id. at 266 ("For it is a rare case of prohibited extraterritorial application that lacks
all contact with the territory of the United States. But the presumption against extraterrito-
rial application would be a craven watchdog indeed if it retreated to its kennel whenever
some domestic activity is involved in the case.").
127. See id.
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presumption and apply the ATS to extraterritorial claims-it is important
to recognize what the Court did not say in Morrison. It did not say that
the Court could apply § 10(b) of the Exchange Act when domestic trans-
actions occur because this would be a purely domestic application of the
law.13 1 It made no comment about what circumstances would result in a
purely domestic application of § 10(b). 13 2 Rather, it simply said that it
could enforce § 10(b) when domestic conduct consists of domestic securi-
ties transactions or securities transactions on American exchanges be-
cause the statute focuses on regulating those particular types of
transactions. 1 3 3 Thus, it was simply saying it could enforce the statute if
conduct to the claim fell within the statute's focus.
At this point, it is important to also recognize that, unlike its reference
to the securities transactions, the Court never said that the deceptive con-
duct necessary for a § 10(b) claim had to also occur domestically. In fact,
it said that the statute was unconcerned with the location of the decep-
tion, despite also recognizing that the statute punished deceptive con-
duct.134 Thus, it would not be inconsistent with Morrison to say that
§ 10(b) could apply extraterritorially to foreign deceptive conduct so long
as the transactions occurred domestically or on American exchanges.135
This would amount to nothing more than "punish[ing] deceptive conduct
. . . 'in connection with the purchase or sale of any security registered on a
national securities exchange or any security not so registered.' 1 3 6
It is apparent, then, that a potential result of the focus-based analysis in
Morrison is consistent with a potential result of the displacement stan-
dard in Kiobel: extraterritoriality. In both Morrison and Kiobel, there was
a presumption already in place because there was foreign conduct in-
volved with the claim and no clear intent to rebut the presumption. 37
Nevertheless, in Morrison, the Supreme Court engaged in an extra analy-
sis to determine if it could still apply the statute based on the type of
domestic contacts involved.138 Since the Court never limited the applica-
131. See id. at 266-73. But see Colangelo, supra note 10, at 32, for an argument that
Morrison's focus-based analysis seeks to apply the law domestically.
132. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266-73. The only time the Court mentioned the possibil-
ity of a domestic application was when it recited the petitioners' argument that they were
only trying to apply § 10(b) domestically. Id. at 266. The Court, however, appeared to
recharacterize the petitioners' argument. First, it appeared to disagree with how petition-
ers' framed the issues by explaining that petitioners' argument was "less an answer to the
presumption against extraterritorial application than it [was] an assertion . . . that that
presumption here (as often) is not self-evidently dispositive." Id. at 266. Then, it went on to
describe the relevant issue as whether or not domestic conduct could cause the presump-
tion to retreat-which presumably permits an extraterritorial application-instead of ask-
ing if it was a domestic application of the statute, a circumstance in which the presumption
would not be triggered in the first place. Id.




137. Compare id. at 266 with Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659,
1669 (2013).
138. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266-73.
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tion under this analysis to a domestic application,139 the Court did not
foreclose the possibility that the analysis might result in an extraterrito-
rial application of the statute if, for example, the deceptive conduct oc-
curred abroad and securities were purchased domestically or on
American exchanges. 140 Similarly, in Kiobel, the Supreme Court identi-
fied a circumstance in which certain domestic contacts would displace the
presumption and thus permit the Court to apply the statute to extraterri-
torial claims.141 This clear parallel between Kiobel and Morrison makes
sense of why the Court would cite to Morrison to support the displace-
ment standard in Kiobel.
An important difference between the two cases, however, is the exact
language each uses to describe the domestic contacts necessary to over-
come the presumption. Morrison identified the necessary domestic con-
tacts as "conduct" that fits within the "focus" of the statute.142 Kiobel, on
the other hand, said that "claims" must touch and concern the United
States with "sufficient force."1 43 However, since Kiobel cited to Morri-
son's focus-based analysis to support the displacement standard, the dis-
placement standard should be interpreted in a way that is compatible
with the focus-based analysis in Morrison. Interpreting the displacement
standard in this light reveals that for a claim to touch and concern the
United States with sufficient force to displace the presumption, it is at
least necessary for domestic contacts to fall within the focus of the ATS.
At least one federal district court, in the Northern District of Alabama,
has explained the requirements of Kiobel's displacement standard in a
manner consistent with this interpretation.144 Relying on Kiobel's citation
to Morrison, the court explained that "where a complaint alleges activity
in both foreign and domestic spheres, an extraterritorial application of a
statute arises only if the event on which the statute focuses did not occur
abroad."145 Thus, the court made clear that where there are domestic and
foreign events involved in a claim, the ATS could apply extraterritorially
if the domestic events fall within its focus. Given the facts before it, how-
ever, the court was unable to apply the ATS to the extraterritorial claim.
It held, among other things, that the focus of the ATS was the tortious
conduct violating the law of nations, and that the tort occurred abroad;
therefore, the presumption barred the claim.146
139. See supra notes 131-33 and accompanying text.
140. See supra notes 134-36 and accompanying text. It is worth noting that Kiobel's
citation to Morrison to support the possibility of displacing the presumption, and thus ap-
plying the ATS to extraterritorial claims, appears to signal that Morrison's focus-based
analysis is consistent with extraterritoriality.
141. See Kiobel, 561 U.S. at 266.
142. See Morrison, 130 S. Ct. at 2884.
143. Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
144. Giraldo v. Drummond Co., Inc., No. 2:09-CV-1041-RDP, 2013 WL 3873960, at *8
(N.D. Ala. Jul. 25, 2013).
145. Id. (emphasis added in part, original in part).
146. Id.
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B. THE Focus OF THE ATS IS THE CLAIMS IT AUTHORIZES
Having established that the displacement standard at least requires do-
mestic conduct to fall within the focus of the ATS in order to trigger
extraterritoriality, an obvious question arises: what is the focus of the
ATS? The Supreme Court has never directly answered this question, but
it has provided the tools to do so. The answer lies, again, in the Court's
citation to Morrison's focus-based analysis. Therefore, the method used
in Morrison to discern the Exchange Act's focus is the most appropriate
means of discovering the focus of the ATS. However, the Court in Kiobel
appears to provide a strong hint as to the answer at the beginning of its
opinion. It said that the ATS is a "strictly jurisdictional" statute-it does
not simply regulate conduct, as § 10(b) did in Morrison; it instead autho-
rizes federal courts to recognize certain claims:147 torts committed against
aliens in violation of the law of nations or a treaty signed by the United
States.148 The methods used in Morrison reveal that this is precisely what
the focus of the ATS is, that is, the focus of the ATS is the entire claim it
authorizes federal courts to recognize.
The Supreme Court in Morrison defined the "focus" of a statute as
both the "congressional concern" and the "objects of the statute's solici-
tude." 149 To discern the congressional and statutory concern of the Ex-
change Act, the Court examined its text and context. For example, it
examined the prologue of the Exchange Act to identify its "object" and
§§ 30(a) and (b) to show the statute's emphasis on the location of transac-
tions.' 50 As additional evidence of the statute's focus, the Court pointed
out that the Securities Act-"enacted by the same Congress as the Ex-
change Act, and forming part of the same comprehensive reputation of
securities trading"-contained the same focus.' 5'
As mentioned above, the Supreme Court in Kiobel identified the text
of the ATS as strictly jurisdictional, which means it strictly authorizes fed-
eral courts to hear a particular claim.152 This is further supported by the
ATS's location within the Judiciary Act of 1789: it is part of the section
specifically authorizing federal district courts to recognize various
claims.' 53 Based on the text and context of the statute, then, it is clear
that the focus of the ATS is the claim it authorizes federal district courts
to recognize. 154 This makes sense of why the Court in Kiobel chose to use
147. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664 (2013).
148. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
149. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266-67 (2010).
150. Id. at 267-68.
151. Id. at 268.
152. See supra note 147 and accompanying text.
153. See 28 U.S.C. §§ 1330-69 (2012).
154. But see Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1670 (2013) (Alito,
J., concurring) ("The Court's decision in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, makes clear that when
the ATS was enacted, 'congressional concern' was .'focus[ed]"' on the 'three principal of-
fenses against the law of nations' that had been identified by Blackstone: violation of safe
conducts, infringement of the rights of ambassadors, and piracy... . In other words, only
conduct that satisfies Sosa's requirements of definiteness and acceptance among civilized
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the word "claim" to identify what must touch and concern the United
States to displace the presumption.155
C. "CLAIM" MEANS MORE THAN CONDUCT
This discovery brings us to an important question underlying the dis-
placement standard: what does the Court mean by "claim"? There are
two important pieces of evidence showing that the Court in Kiobel used
the word "claim" to mean all the facts necessary to state a claim, not just
the conduct.
First, the Supreme Court specifically used the word "claim" instead of
"conduct" when it described what was necessary to displace the presump-
tion.156 If all the Court meant was conduct needed to occur within the
United States, it could have easily said so. Indeed, immediately before
the displacement standard, it used the word "conduct" to describe what
took place outside the United States in Kiobel.157 The Court then fol-
lowed this description by using the word "claim" to describe what must
touch and concern the United States.158 A likely explanation for why the
Court chose to use the word "claim" in a sentence immediately following
another sentence in which it chose to use the word "conduct" is that the
Court meant something other than conduct.
Second, a "claim," by definition, is not limited to just conduct. Black's
Law Dictionary defines a claim as "[tihe aggregate of operative facts giv-
ing rise to a right enforceable by a court."159 A right enforceable by a
court requires facts showing the relevant conduct, defendant, and plaintiff
regulated by the statute. Conduct alone does not give rise to an enforcea-
ble right by a court if the plaintiffs or defendants do not fall within the
class of people regulated by the statute. For example, under the ATS, the
plaintiff must not only be injured by the defendant's use of tortious con-
duct in violation of the law of nations, but the plaintiff must also be an
"alien."160 Then, and only then, do the facts constitute a right enforceable
by the federal courts under the ATS. Thus, it is clear that the facts re-
quired to state a claim require more than merely showing conduct regu-
lated by the statute. And when the Supreme Court chose to use the word
"claim" instead of "conduct," this is what it communicated.
nations can be said to have been 'the "focus" of congressional concern' when Congress
enacted the ATS.") (internal citations omitted) (emphasis added).




159. BLACK'S LAw DICTIONARY 281 (9th ed. 2009); see also Al Shimari v. CACI Pre-
mier Tech., Inc., No. 13-1937, 2014 WL 2922840, at *8 (4th Cir. June 30, 2014).
160. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (2012).
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D. THE SUPREME COURT IMPOSED AN EXTRA REQUIREMENT OF
SUFFICIENT FORCE TO PREVENT A "CRAVEN WATCHDOG"
As established above, by citing to Morrison, the Court in Kiobel in-
structs that displacement of the presumption occurs when-at the very
least-domestic conduct fits within the focus of the statute. The focus of
the ATS is likely claims constituting torts against aliens in violation of the
law of nations. And claims consist of facts-such as the identity of the
defendant-necessary to enforce a legal right.
Together, these facts explain most of Kiobel's displacement standard.
They do not, however, explain the "sufficient force" requirement. This
requirement cannot be understood until one considers the potential con-
sequence of applying the focus-based analysis to the ATS without the
"sufficient force" requirement and compares that consequence to the pre-
sumption's prowess as a watchdog. In Morrison, the Court identified cer-
tain conduct as the focus of the Exchange Act-domestic securities
transactions-and then limited application of the statute to situations in
which that focus-based conduct occurred. 161 Application of Morrison's
focus-based analysis to the ATS, however, would not be limited to just
conduct. Instead, because the focus of the ATS is the claims it authorizes,
it would involve all of the facts necessary to state a claim. And because
the presumption applies to the claim, which is the focus of the statute, the
focus would be limited to the domestic facts of the claim. Thus, the focus-
based analysis would be satisfied whenever there were domestic facts
necessary to state a claim for tortious conduct against an alien in violation
of the law of nations. This is an important distinction that opens the fo-
cus-based analysis up to interpretations capable of producing results not
contemplated by the Court in Morrison. For example, a court might de-
cide that the focus-based requirement is satisfied so long as the claim
involves some domestic facts. Stated another way, it would permit extra-
territorial application of the ATS whenever claims arising under it
touched and concerned the United States-which is an exact restatement
of the displacement standard without the sufficient force requirement.162
This could occur whenever the defendant was a U.S citizen or maintained
a strong corporate presence, even though all of the conduct occurred
abroad.
I propose that the Supreme Court added the "sufficient force" require-
ment in response to this potentially expansive consequence of applying
the focus-based analysis to a jurisdictional statute. Such an application
would eviscerate the Court's admonition in Morrison that not just any
domestic activity relevant to the claim is sufficient to cause the presump-
tion to "retreat[ ] to its kennel."163 It turns the presumption into a "cra-
161. Morrison v. Nat'l Austl. Bank, Ltd., 561 U.S. 247, 266 (2010).
162. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1669.
163. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266; cf Al Shimari v. CA CI Int'l, Inc., 951 F.Supp.2d 857,
868 (E.D. Va. 2013), rev'd on other grounds, No. 13-1937, 2014 WL 2922840 (4th Cir. June
30, 2014) ("It is no small distinction that the Court's explanation [in Morrison] involved
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ven watchdog." 164 Anticipating this problem, I think the Court
preemptively adjusted the application of the focus-based analysis to the
ATS.
Adjusting the application of Morrison to avoid an overly broad extra-
territorial application of the ATS is consistent with the Court's adjust-
ment of the presumption's application at the beginning of its opinion in
Kiobel. The Court went out of its way to prevent unhindered extraterrito-
rial application of the ATS by applying the presumption to the claims it
authorized,165 even though in Morrison the Court made clear that the
presumption did not impact the Exchange Act's jurisdictional provi-
sion.166 Similarly, I think the Court adjusted Morrison's focus-based re-
quirements to prevent an overly broad extraterritorial application of the
ATS by requiring sufficient force. With this additional requirement, the
Court finalized its displacement standard.
E. SUFFICIENT FORCE REQUIRES DOMESTIC CONDUCT
If the Court added the sufficient force requirement to avoid the possi-
bility of turning the presumption into a craven watchdog, a good starting
point to determine what sufficient force requires is the presumption itself.
The presumption has traditionally only concerned itself with the location
of the relevant conduct.167 Therefore, the most relevant fact to determine
whether the presumption should retreat is the location of the conduct.
The presumption would be a craven watchdog indeed if its protection
against the impermissible extraterritorial application of statutes was ren-
dered impotent by the location of something it should not be concerned
about.
Accordingly, the one time the Supreme Court considered the possibil-
ity of the presumption's retreat, in Morrison, the focus of the statute re-
lated to the location of conduct.168 On the other hand, the Court showed
no concern for the defendant's domestic presence.169 It would make
sense, then, for the Court in Kiobel to correct the expansive effects of
applying the focus-based analysis to claims under the ATS by reducing
those effects to something similar to what it permitted in Morrison: do-
mestic conduct falling within the focus of the statute. Indeed, this is an-
other possible reason why Kiobel cited to Morrison to support the
displacement standard.
statutes that regulated conduct, while the ATS is purely jurisdictional ... with a potentially
unlimited scope.").
164. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.
165. See Kiobel, 133 S. Ct. at 1664-65.
166. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 272; see also Anthony J. Colangelo, Kiobel Insta-Sympo-
sium: Kiobel Contradicts Morrison, OPINION JURIS (May 10, 2013, 9:00 AM), http://opinio
juris.org/2013/05/10/kiobel-insta-symposium-kiobel-contradicts-morrison/.
167. Balintulo v. Daimler AG, 727 F.3d 174, 190 n.24 (2d Cir. 2013).
168. See Morrison, 561 U.S. at 266.
169. See id. at 266-73.
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This conclusion is consistent with both the Supreme Court's opinion in
Kiobel and the post-Kiobel cases addressing ATS claims involving Ameri-
can defendants. The Second Circuit has observed that the Court in Kiobel
was concerned exclusively with the location of the defendant's conduct; it
did not consider this to be just "one prong of a multi-factor test." 170 The
Supreme Court framed its inquiry this way, repeated the importance of
the conduct's location eight separate times within the opinion,171 and
then concluded that it could not displace the presumption and apply the
ATS because "all the relevant conduct took place outside the United
States."1 72 And shortly thereafter, concerned about expansive extraterri-
torial application of the ATS, it warned that "it would reach too far to say
that mere corporate presence suffices" to displace the presumption. 73 In
light of these facts, the Second Circuit concluded that, despite facts show-
ing an American defendant, the presumption could not be displaced be-
cause all relevant conduct occurred abroad.174 Moreover, as mentioned
above, and consistent with the Second Circuit, of the three other Federal
courts to have addressed extraterritorial ATS claims involving American
defendants, the two that applied the ATS placed great significance on the
domestic conduct involved. 75
Given the above analysis, the most likely answer to what the Supreme
Court meant by sufficient force is domestic conduct relevant to the claim.
In sum, a straightforward application of Morrison's focus-based analysis
cited to by Kiobel would potentially turn the presumption into a craven
watchdog by causing it to retreat to its kennel whenever domestic facts
are part of the claim. Thus, to ensure that the presumption remains an
effective watchdog among the lower courts, the Supreme Court limited
the type of domestic facts capable of making the presumption retreat (i.e.,
limited the scope of the focus); the relevant facts need to possess suffi-
cient force. The presumption's traditional concern with the location of the
conduct but not the identity or location of the defendant indicates that
the location of conduct is the relevant fact when considering the pre-
sumption's retreat. This is consistent with the Court's opinion in Morri-
son, and its emphasis on the location of the conduct in reaching its
decision in Kiobel coupled with its express rejection of the defendant's
presence being sufficient to displace the presumption. Therefore, it is rea-
sonable to conclude that when the Court limited the facts capable of
causing the presumption to retreat, it limited those facts to domestic con-
duct. This conclusion is further supported by the significance post-Kiobel
courts have placed on the location of relevant conduct when considering
ATS claims involving American defendants.
170. See Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 189-91.
171. See Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 133 S. Ct. 1659, 1664-67 (2013).
172. See id. at 1669.
173. See id.
174. See Balintulo, 727 F.3d at 192.
175. See supra notes 119-20 and accompanying text.
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IV. AN "ESSENTIAL STEP" TO DISPLACING THE
PRESUMPTION AGAINST EXTRATERRITORIALITY
Interpreting Kiobel in light of Morrison, therefore, provides the legal
framework to begin answering what is required to displace the presump-
tion. It is clear that the displacement standard requires domestic conduct
relevant to the claim. 176 However, not all the conduct can occur domesti-
cally because this would produce a territorial claim rather than an extra-
territorial claim.177 Thus, when the Court contemplated the force
sufficient to displace the presumption, it must have had in mind a situa-
tion in which part of the relevant conduct occurred abroad and part of it
occurred domestically. For instance, in a direct liability claim, this would
require part of the tortious conduct to occur abroad and part of it to
occur domestically.
This presents an odd set of facts that at first glance appears to be so
obscure that it renders any hope of displacing the presumption useless. I
argue, however, that the essential step doctrine, used by the Supreme
Court in Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., provides a workable solution. 78 It
allows courts to rely on a well-settled legal doctrine to identify domestic
conduct that is factually part of the tortious conduct responsible for the
violation of the law of nations abroad. Once this domestic conduct is
identified by the essential step doctrine, courts can rely on that conduct as
sufficient force to displace the presumption and apply the ATS to the
extraterritorial claim.
A. Ti-tE "ESSENTIAL STEP DOCTRINE" PERMITS APPLICATION OF THE
ATS TO CERTAIN EXTRATERRITORIAL CLAIMS CONNECTED
To DOMESTIC CONDUCT
When a defendant commits conduct within the United States that is an
essential step in a scheme to consummate conduct abroad giving rise to a
claim under the ATS, the essential step doctrine should be invoked to
show that the claim touches and concerns the United States with suffi-
cient force to displace the presumption. As explained by the Supreme
Court in Steele, the essential step doctrine is a legal doctrine that has the
effect of making lawful acts unlawful when they form part of a larger
scheme to commit an unlawful act.179 The Court used the doctrine to help
176. Even if the reader does not find the foregoing discussion in Part III convincing, it
is clear that lower courts are interpreting the displacement standard to require domestic
conduct. See supra notes 111-13, 119-20. This portion of the paper applies directly to that
requirement, and does not depend on the foregoing explanation for why this is the correct
interpretation. Thus, it should not be dismissed merely because the reader disagrees with
Part III.
177. The Supreme Court had in mind an extraterritorial claim when it included the
displacement standard: the presumption against extraterritoriality had been triggered and
the Court recognized that certain conduct would "displace" that presumption. See Kiobel,
133 S. Ct. at 1669.
178. See supra note 59 and accompanying text.
179. See id.
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explain why the Lanham Act applied extraterritorially,180 and the extra-
territorial application of the Lanham Act in Steele has been repeatedly
affirmed by the Court.181 The doctrine's relevance to extraterritorial con-
duct has proven to be trans-substantive-just ten years after Steele, the
Supreme Court applied the doctrine to bring extraterritorial conduct
within the scope of the Sherman Act.182 Indeed, the Court, citing to Steele
for support, described the doctrine as a "well[-]settled" part of its juris-
prudence.183 Lower courts have continued to apply the doctrine to bring
conduct within the scope of various state and federal laws.'8
Although the Court in Steele did not take the time to explain why inno-
cent conduct became unlawful, the likely explanation is that the court was
treating each step taken in the scheme as a component part of the unlaw-
ful conduct brought about by the scheme. As a result, the lawful conduct
became unlawful because it was viewed by the Court as a factual part of
the conduct the statute prohibits. Thus, in Steele, the domestic purchases
became unlawful because the Court viewed them, as a matter of fact, as
part of the foreign infringement for which they were purchased-i.e.,
they were viewed as part of the conduct prohibited by the Lanham Act.
This explanation is supported by a relatively recent federal district court
opinion discussing the doctrine's application to prohibited conspiracies
under the Sherman Act. In 2004, the U.S. District Court for the District
of Columbia provided the following explanation of the doctrine by quot-
ing an early Supreme Court opinion that preceded Steele: "'if [innocent
acts] are part of the sum of the acts which are relied upon to effectuate
the conspiracy which the [Sherman Act] forbids, they come within its pro-
hibition." 85 That is to say, acts essential to the consummation of the
prohibited conduct are unlawful because they are component parts of the
prohibited conduct.
This factual consequence produced by the essential step doctrine's ap-
plication should cause certain domestic conduct involved in ATS claims
to possess sufficient force to displace the presumption. The effect of its
180. See id.
181. See supra notes 62-64, 86-87, and accompanying text.
182. See Cont'l Ore Co. v. Union Carbide & Carbon Corp., 370 U.S. 690, 707 (1962)
(citing numerous Supreme Court cases, including Steele, to support the doctrine's applica-
tion to the Sherman Act, and explaining that the essential step doctrine permits antitrust
liability to still attach to transactions with the Canadian government even though the sale
was legal under Canadian law).
183. Id. ("It is well settled that acts which are in themselves legal lose that character
when they become constituent elements of an unlawful scheme.") (citing to Steele v. Bul-
ova Watch Co., among other cases).
184. United States v. Jackson, 33 F.3d 866, 871 (7th Cir. 1994) (conspiracy to defraud
the U.S.); Brunswick Corp. v. Vineberg, 370 F.2d 605, 612 (5th Cir. 1967) (tortious interfer-
ence with contract); IHS Dialysis Inc. v. Davita, Inc., 12 CIV. 2468 ER, 2013 WL 1309737,
at *7 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 2013) (anti-competitive conduct under the Sherman Act); Jones v.
Coughlin, 665 F. Supp. 1040, 1046 (S.D.N.Y. 1987) (civil rights violations involving tortious
conduct); United States v. City of Parma, Ohio, 494 F. Supp. 1049, 1055 (N.D. Ohio 1980)
(racial discrimination under the Fair Housing Act).
185. Jung v. Ass'n of Am. Med. Colleges, 300 F. Supp. 2d 119, 160-61 (D.D.C. 2004)
(quoting Am. Tobacco Co. v. United States, 328 U.S. 781, 809 (1946)).
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application to direct liability claims is to make the defendant's domestic
essential step in a scheme to commit a foreign tort in violation of the law
of nations factually part of the final step completing the tortious conduct
abroad.18 6 This effect produces the scenario the Supreme Court must
have had in mind when it wrote the displacement standard. As discussed
above, the Court most likely requires relevant domestic conduct to satisfy
the sufficient force requirement and the displacement standard was in-
tended as a means to apply the ATS extraterritorially.187 The only com-
patible scenario for a direct liability claim is one in which part of the
tortious conduct occurs domestically and part of the tortious conduct oc-
curs abroad. As just discussed, the essential step doctrine is capable of
producing this exact scenario. Therefore, through application of the es-
sential step doctrine, domestic conduct constituting an essential step in a
scheme that violated the law of nations abroad should qualify as sufficient
force to displace the presumption, enabling a court to apply the ATS to
the extraterritorial claim arising from that law-of-nations violation.
A few examples of when the essential step doctrine might become use-
ful for ATS claims can be illustrated by examining variations of the Filar-
tiga facts:188 when a defendant kidnaps an alien in the U.S. and then
tortures him abroad; when a defendant purchases or manufactures all the
component parts within the U.S. for devices used to torture aliens
abroad; when a defendant plans and manages from within the U.S. the
kidnap and torture of an alien abroad; or when a corporate defendant
within the U.S. hires employees domestically and then encourages those
employees to torture an alien abroad. Indeed, the only post-Kiobel ATS
claims to displace the presumption involved similar facts. In Al Shimari v.
CACI Premier Tech., Inc., the employees of the corporate defendant
were hired "in the United States" and their "managers located in the
United States were aware of reports of misconduct abroad, attempted to
'cover up' the misconduct, and 'implicitly, if not expressly, encouraged'
it."189 Similarly, in Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, the defendant
"plann[ed] and manag[ed] a campaign of repression in Uganda from the
United States." 190 The court found this conduct "analogous to a terrorist
designing and manufacturing a bomb in this country, which he then mails
186. Cf Coughlin, 665 F. Supp. at 1046 (explaining that non-tortious conduct can be-
come tortious when it is linked to tortious conduct through the essential step doctrine).
187. See the introduction to Part IV.
188. See supra note 30 and accompanying text. Although Filartiga applied only to "offi-
cial" torture perpetrated by state actors, and the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA)
codified this cause of action, the modern law of nations has been understood to include
acts of torture committed by private individuals in furtherance of genocide or war crimes.
See Kadic v. Karadzic, 70 F.3d 232, 243 (2d Cir. 1995); see also Romero v. Drummond Co.,
Inc., 552 F.3d 1303, 1316 (11th Cir. 2008). Moreover, despite the statutory cause of action
now available under the TVPA for "official" torture, a plaintiff alleging official torture can
still bring a cause of action under the ATS as a distinct claim. See Romero, 552 F.3d at
1316.
189. No. 13-1937, 2014 WL 2922840, at *10 (4th Cir. June 30, 2014).
190. 960 F. Supp. 2d 304, 322 (D. Mass. 2013).
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to Uganda with the intent that it explode there." 191
B. SIMILARITIES AND DIFFERENCES WITH ACCESSORIAL LIABILITY
The district court in Sexual Minorities, however, did not conclude that
the defendant was liable for the actual "repression," but instead was lia-
ble for the independent international law violation of aiding and abetting
the repression.192 Aiding and abetting claims, and perhaps conspiracy
claims, have the potential to overlap with direct liability claims actionable
through the essential step doctrine.193 However, liability for domestic aid-
ing and abetting or conspiracy connected to the tortious conduct is dis-
tinct in three important respects from attaching liability for the tortious
conduct through the essential step doctrine.
First, and most importantly for purposes of this paper, the defendant
will be liable for the independent domestic conduct of aiding and abetting
or conspiracy; she will not be directly liable for the extraterritorial tor-
tious conduct,194 as she would be under the essential step doctrine. This
results in a domestic application of the ATS because the court is punish-
ing the domestic aiding and abetting or conspiracy conduct as an indepen-
dent cause of action under the ATS.195 As a result, Kiobel's displacement
standard should not come into play.
Second, both aiding and abetting and conspiracy claims require two
actors coordinating to achieve a common objective.196 The essential step
doctrine, however, can be triggered when there is only one actor engaging
in two separate, but related acts. 197 At least three of the four Filartiga-
based examples above described circumstances where one actor triggered
the application of the essential step doctrine to a claim under the ATS:
(1) when a defendant kidnaps an alien in the U.S. and tortures him
abroad; (2) when a defendant purchases or manufactures all the compo-
nent parts within the U.S. for torture devices used abroad; and (3) when a
corporate defendant within the U.S. hires domestically and then encour-
ages its employees to torture aliens abroad.
191. Id.
192. See id. at 330.
193. Moreover, as mentioned above, the essential step doctrine can also be employed to
show that lawful conduct became part of an unlawful conspiracy. See supra note 185 and
accompanying text. There is no reason this should not extend to aiding and abetting as
well. However, this is not what I mean when I say that the essential step doctrine may
overlap with aiding and abetting or conspiracy. I mean conduct standing alone that would
satisfy the elements of accessorial liability may also be sufficient to attach to the corre-
sponding direct liability claim through the essential step doctrine. See Sexual Minorities
discussed above for an example of this type of conduct.
194. See Cabello v. Fernandez-Larius, 402 F.3d 1148, 1158 (2005) (discussing direct and
indirect liability as two separate claims under the ATS).
195. See id. at 1157-58; Liu Bo Shan v. China Const. Bank Corp., 421 F. App'x 89, 93
(2d Cir. 2011).
196. See, e.g., Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1158-59 (11th Cir. 2005).
197. See Steele v. Bulova Watch Co., 344 U.S. 280, 287 (1952) (defendant engaged in
both the domestic purchase of component parts constituting the essential step and the for-
eign trademark infringement for which those parts were used).
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Finally, there is an important difference associated with the culpability
attached to each claim. The difference between liability as an aider and
abettor or conspirator and liability through the essential step doctrine is
that the former is indirect liability and the latter is direct liability-e.g.,
the difference between being held liable as an accessory of torture and
being held liable for committing torture.198 It is likely, however, that ac-
cessorial liability under the ATS is equivalent to the principal's liabil-
ity.199 Thus, this distinction might be a distinction without a difference to
those plaintiffs only concerned with monetary compensation. However, it
may make a difference to other plaintiffs who believe the defendant is
directly responsible for the tortious conduct and that the moral culpabil-
ity publicly attached to perpetrating the actual tortious conduct is greater
than the moral culpability publicly attached to assisting in that con-
duct.2 0 0 For example, as described above, a defendant who, from within
the U.S., helps manage the kidnap and torture of an alien abroad would
likely fit within this category. In these instances, the plaintiff should con-
sider using the essential step doctrine to displace the presumption and
apply the ATS to the extraterritorial claim rather than the domestic ac-
cessorial claim.
In sum, liability through the essential step doctrine contrasts with ac-
cessorial liability by providing an opportunity to satisfy Kiobel's displace-
ment standard, while also avoiding the disadvantages of secondary
liability. Defendants can be held liable for extraterritorial tortious con-
duct without an accessory-principal relationship; and even when relying
on that relationship, defendants can still be held liable for perpetrating
the tortious conduct instead of merely as an accessory to it. However, it
does come with its own disadvantage: it has never been used in connec-
tion with an ATS claim; whereas, aiding and abetting liability under the
ATS has been accepted by all the circuit courts that have considered it,2 01
and conspiracy claims have been recognized under customary interna-
tional law for select crimes.202 Nevertheless, the essential step doctrine is
a well-settled doctrine that the Supreme Court has used across subject
198. See Cabello, 402 F.3d at 1158-59.
199. See Daniel Diskin, Note, The Historical and Modern Foundations for Aiding and
Abetting Liability Under the Alien Tort Statute, 47 ARIZ. L. REV. 805, 822-23 (2005) ("In
civil actions, persons aiding and abetting as accessories were treated the same as principals
in cases decided shortly before or after passage of the ATS").
200. Cf Joshua Dressler, Reforming Complicity Law: Trivial Assistance As A Lesser
Offense?, 5 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 427, 428 (2008) ("American accomplice law ... treats the
accomplice in terms of guilt and, potentially, punishment, as if she were the perpetrator,
even when her culpability is often less than that of the perpetrator . . ).
201. Sexual Minorities Uganda v. Lively, 12-CV-30051-MAP, 2013 WL 4130756, at
*11 (D. Mass. Aug. 14, 2013).
202. Liu Bo Shan v. China Constr. Bank Corp., 421 F. App'x 89, 94 n.6 (2d Cir. 2011).
Given this history, it is worth pointing out that, if the domestic conduct cannot be directly
connected to the foreign tortious conduct through the essential step doctrine, it might be
possible for victims of human rights abuses abroad to still use the ATS to access U.S.
Courts by using the essential step doctrine to connect the domestic conduct to foreign
aiding and abetting or conspiracy related to the claim. See supra note 185.
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matters to help apply statutes extraterritorially.203 It should apply with
equal force to ATS claims.
CONCLUSION
Although Kiobel severely restricts the ATS's application to extraterri-
torial claims, and thus the ATS's usefulness as a vehicle for international
human rights litigation, it does not eliminate it entirely. The future of the
ATS's extraterritorial application depends on the interpretation of Ki-
obel's displacement standard. The displacement standard in Kiobel
should be interpreted in light of the entire paragraph in which it is found,
including the citation to Morrison's focus-based analysis. This approach
reveals that the displacement standard is likely a recitation of the focus-
based analysis as applied to the ATS, but with an additional element of
sufficient force to prevent the presumption from becoming a craven
watchdog. The essential step doctrine-a well-settled legal doctrine that
the Supreme Court has used in connection with extraterritorial claims-
provides a small window of opportunity to satisfy the displacement stan-
dard and apply the ATS to claims alleging extraterritorial law-of-nations
violations. Practitioners and courts should consider this doctrine when
determining the merits of future ATS claims that include domestic con-
duct connected to tortious conduct abroad.
203. See supra notes 180 and 182, and accompanying text.
2014] 399
400 SMU LAW REVIEW [Vol. 67
